Election Process Protection: Location Specific Custom Study, Registration, Voting Tallying, and Recommendations

SKU ID :WGR-13530802 | Published Date: 11-Jun-2017 | No. of pages: 129
Election Process Protection: Executive Summary The Study Itself Is A Custom Look At Any Particular Election District With Commentary On Particular Vulnerabilities And Recommendations For Improvement. This Includes Recommendations For Improvement In The Election Code Voting Machines Prelude 2 Growing Up With Voting Machines 2 Voting Machine Hacking Dynamics A Successful Hack 8 Gaps In Our Democracy 14 Backdoor Hacks 16 “To put this to bed with piece of mind we need to count the votes,” said Stein. Bruce Schneier, a voting expert at the Kennedy School and adjunct lecturer says a recount would not address the possibility of tampering with electronic voting machines. 1 “There are some weirdness’s in the vote tallies that could be explained by any number of things and election machine hacking is one of them,” Schneier said. “We need to do forensic analysis of the machines and look at the various internet trails, this is a lot of work and it’s unclear to me if a recount includes this.” Hacking Individual U.S. Voting Machines Problem Statement A System Is Only As Good As Its Weakest Link “Threat of Outside Intervention in the US Election Process / Could Russian Hackers Spoil Election Day?” How To Make Fraud Detectable Hacking Solution: Need for Emergency Voting Machine Law Statement of The Problem: Intensity of the Campaign The Possibility Of A Close Election That Is Decided By Fraud Donald Trump Do We Trust Donald Trump? Vulnerabilities Of The Vote Counting System Hillary Clinton All Elections Are Local Suggestions to Fix the Vote Counting Election Process Hacking Problem in the Near Term Hillary or Donald Teamsters Story Securing Against Hacks from Russia We Are A Country Of Laws The Nature Of Software The Value of Software Certain Protections Need To Be Put In Place Now Types of Hack Attacks Paper Audit Trail Provides Security for Election Vote Counting Electronic Voting Machine Certification Systems Paper Ballot Audit Trail Jurisdictions Can Print A Paper Ballot Voting Machine Cyberattack Counter Attack Ballot Configuration Down Loading Ballot Images Vulnerability To Those Who Say There Is Not Enough Time Requiring a Paper Ballot Audit Trail Conclusion Susan Eustis: My Credentials
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